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Scienter and the Flexible Duty Under Rule lob-5 
A major focus of private litigation under rule lob-5l is the determina- 
tion of the proper standard or duty applicable to alleged violators of the 
rule. Legislative2 and administrative3 histories are not helpful in estab- 
lishing a civil action standard, for they are couched in the language of 
common law fraud. The rule itself is written in strict liability language.4 
Realizing that rule lob-5 was enacted to deter many forms of fraudu- 
lent activity,5 most courts have rejected the extreme standards of strict 
liability6 and common law fraud,7 and have chosen an intermediate test 
'A private right of action under rule lob-5 was not always available. I t  is clear today, how- 
ever, that one exists. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 
(1971) (Supreme Court recognizes a private action); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. 
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3871 (1969); Note, Proof of  
Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-fraud Rule lob-5, 63 MICH. L.R. 1070, 
1072 (1965). 
2"The [Senate] Report.. . is replete with words and phrases indicating that the act was 
designed primarily to prohibit fraudulent activities. Nowhere does the Report imply that 
liability without culpability would attach for material misrepresentations." Kohn v. American 
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,277 (3d Cir. 1972). 
Wpon releasing rule lob-5, the SEC stated, "the new rule closes a loophole in the protec- 
tions against fraud. . . by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they 
engage in fraud in their purchase." SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3230 
(May 2 1,1942). 
4Rule lob-5, 17 C.F.R. $ 240,lOb-5 (Supp. 1974), Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive 
Devices. 
I t  shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper- 
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
5See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 278 (3d Cir. 1972); Trussel v. 
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 771 (D. Colo. 1964) (for recovery in a private 
action, a party must prove violation of a criminal statute); 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: 
FRAUD SEC RULE lob-5 5 2.2 (420) at 22.7 (1970); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations 
Under Rule lob-5,32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824,825 (1965). 
6"If we choose to deter, say, misrepresentations, we may think it wise to go all the way and 
make innocent misrepresentations actionable. But this reduces incentives to be careful, since 
care is no defense (though it may still prevent a misrepresentation from occurring)." 2 A. 
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW; FRAUD SEC RULE lob-5, 5 8.4(508) at 204.1 14 (1971). "Moreover, 
despite some dicta suggesting that the second clause [Rule lob-5(b)] provides for absolute 
liability, no court has been willing to apply such a stringent standard." Mann, Rule lob-5: 
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and 
Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206, 1207-08 (1970). 
7"There has. . . been a growing recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of 
fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other tangible 
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they refer to as scienter. Scienter, however, is a term of art and its def- 
inition changes with the court and the facts of the particular case.8 
Judges and commentators can be found to support the proposition 
that the version of scienter to be applied in rule lob-5 cases is a com- 
bination of one or more of the following: knowledgeYg intent,1° reck- 
le~sness ,~~  or negligence.12 Bromberg states that " [p] robably the most 
important step in clarifying the law of scienter would be to ban the 
word."l3 Another commentator, Mann,14 suggests that the proper 
analysis is to develop a flexible standard which can adjust to the wide 
variety of conduct found in alleged rule lob-5 violations. Rather than 
elicit criteria which might enable courts to use the proposed standard, 
Mann merely cites cases holding the defendant to a higher or lower duty 
items of wealth are ill suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and securities, and that 
accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue (footnotes omitted)." 
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963); See also Ellis v. Carter, 
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
8Bromberg breaks scienter into three general categories with sub-areas under each as follows: 
I. Knowledge 
A. Actual 
B. Constructive Knowledge 
11. State of Mind 
A. Intent 
B. Purpose or Motive 
C. Bad Faith 
111. Care 
A. Recklessness 
B. Negligence 
2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, O 8.4(504) at 204.104. 
9See generally Lama v. Drexel and Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1973); Bowman & 
Bourdon, Inc. v. Rohr, 296 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Mass. 1969) affd per curiam 417 F.2d 780 
(1st Cir. 1969); Globus v. Law Research, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 2 A. 
BROMBERG, supra note 6, O 8.4(504) at 204.104-05; Bucklo, Scienter and Rule IOb-5, 67 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 562,570 (1972). 
'Osee generally Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 
951 (1968); Gerstle v. Ganble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); O'Neill v. 
Maytag, 230 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) af4d 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Ruder, Texas 
Gulf Sulphur- The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lob-5 Purchase and 
Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423,44142,444 11.107 (1968). 
llSEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 883, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (concurring 
opinion); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 772-73 (D. Colo. 1964); Pro- 
fessor Loss says that "scienter has been. . . variously defined to mean everything from knowing 
falsity with an implication of mens rea, through the various gradations of recklessness, down 
to such non-action as is virtually equivalent to negligence or eien liability without fault . . . ." 
3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1432 (2d ed. 1961). 
12See generally City Nat'l. Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-31 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 
1968); Sandler and Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 
OHIO ST. L.J. 225, 270-72 (1969); Note, Scienter and Rule lob-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057-67 
(1969). 
132 A. BROMBERG, supra note 6 , s  8.4(503) at 204.103. 
14&Iann, supra note 6, at 1209-20. 
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depending on the presence or absence of certain facts.l5 
It is within this context that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
White v .  Abrams,l6 announced that past definitions of scienter are un- 
workable and adopted a standard based on duty which adjusts to the par- 
ticular fact situation of each case.17 The court stated that the strictness 
of the duty depends on the particular facts involved, and then listed five 
specific factors that the jury may use to determine the defendant's par- 
ticular duty. 
In White, a group of investors, who had a long and trusted relationship 
with the defendant Abrams, were induced by him to loan money at 12 to 
14 percent interest per annum and to buy stock in twenty-six corpora- 
tions controlled and owned by Theodore Richmond. When the Rich- 
mond corporations went bankrupt in 1967, the plaintiffs charged 
Abrams with common law fraud and violation of rule lob-5, alleging 
that he misrepresented (1) the financial position of Richmond and his 
corporations, (2) the use to be made of the loaned funds, and (3) the Rich- 
mond corporations' earnings. Plaintiffs also alleged that Abrams did not 
disclose (1) that he earned large commissions on investments in the Rich- 
mond corporations and (2) that similar investments were made through 
Abrams at higher interest rates (up to 20 percent).18 The district court 
interpreted two prior Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisionslg to re- 
quire a strict liability jury instruction and Abrams was found liableazO 
The court of appeals, however, held that the jury charge was erroneous 
and that a flexible duty standard was required under rule lob-5. With- 
out limiting the trial court from varying the factors to be considered by 
the jury, the court listed the following as some to be considered: 
. . . (1) the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) the de- 
fendant's access to the information as compared to plaintiffs access, (3) the 
benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship, (4) the de- 
fendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their rela- 
tionship in making his investment decisions, and (5) the defendant's 
activity in initiating the securities transaction in question.21 
'5blann supports rejection of the phrases of negligence and scienter for a balancing ap- 
proach which would consider the relationship of the parties, type of relief sought, the plantiffs 
character, and the motivation and nature of the culpable conduct. Id. at 1206-09. 
'6495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). 
"The White court cites Mann, supra note 6, at 1209 and 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, 
5 8.4(513) at 204.115 (1971) in announcing that past definitions of scienter are unworkable. 
495 F.2d at 733-34. 
'8495 F.2d at 727 (9th Cir. 1974). 
lgRoyal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 
270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
20495 F.2d at 734 (9th Cir. 1974). 
21Zd. at 735-36. 
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Another case adopting the flexible duty approach for rule lob-5 cases 
is Hochfelder v. Ernst & E r n ~ t , ~ ~  which was decided subsequent to but 
did not mention White. Because Hochfelder adopts a flexible duty with- 
out expanding it beyond the traditional negligence concept of causation, 
duty, and breach, this comment will be confined to the five factors listed 
in White and the analysis therein. The purpose of this comment is (1) to 
analyze the factors listed in White in terms of the purposes of rule 1 Ob-5, 
(2) to discuss some reasons why the presence or absence of the factors in a 
particular case cause the standard to become more stringent or lax, and 
(3) to explain how the adoption of a flexible standard effectuates the 
purposes behind enactment of the rule. This approach is novel because 
it focuses on a duty which changes according to the particular facts. 
Other courts have required differing versions of scienter depending on 
the existence or absence of the factors listed in White, but none has 
adopted the unique approach of a flexible duty. 
The basic purpose of rule lob-5 is to deter fraudulent activity in securi- 
ties transactions. Its major thrust, similar to that of the federal securities 
laws taken as a whole, is one of full disclosure - the basic premise being 
that persons should be able to deal as they wish. Of course, they cannot 
deal as they wish unless they are fully aware of all the material facts. Al- 
though congressional history does not clearly state the purpose of the rule 
in these te rm~,~3  the Supreme Court has said that the purpose of securities 
legislation in general is ". . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure 
for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard 
of business ethics in the securities industry. "24 Thus, the purpose is not 
to create a scheme of investor's insurance25 in which courts analyze each 
transaction to insure its fairness, but rather to prompt parties to fully 
disclose material facts by imposing penalties26 for failure to do so. Each 
party is then left to decide for himself whether he will purchase or sell the 
securities. With full disclosure, parties can still enter into unfair trans- 
22503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974). 
2 3 C o ~ ,  Fraud in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule IOb-5's Application to Acts of Corporate 
Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. k v .  674, 675 n.3 (1972); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 
IOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 N w .  U.L. k v .  627,64240 (1963). 
24SEC V. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
25E.g., List V. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 45'7, 463 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 81 1 
(1965). 
26Criminal sanctions are not the only possible penalties under the rule. Courts have 
realized that a private action can also have a penalizing and deterring effect on those involved 
in securities transactions. For this reason, Stone has commented that civil actions help police 
the securities market by (1) the bringing of cases that the SEC cannot bring because of its 
limited resources, (2) providing for potentially higher monetary damages than criminal pro- 
ceedings, (3) and by filling in the gaps left by the singular application of criminal penalties. 
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actions, but they will do so knowingly, and fraudulent activity will be 
deterred. 
While deterrence is a worthwhile goal, it should be recognized that all 
fraud cannot be prevented. Thus, another purpose of rule lob-5 is to 
make judicial machinery available which will restore plaintiffs who have 
relied on less than full and accurate disclosure. Upon showing a viola- 
tion of the rule, plaintiffs are then entitled to damages and/or recission 
of the sale to compensate them for their loss. 
The flexible duty standard, as developed by the factors listed in White, 
is based primarily on two important concepts - the foreseeability of the 
plaintiff's reliance by the defendant and the benefit that the defendant 
derives from the transaction. Reliance is not a new concept in rule lob-5 
litigation, but the flexible duty approach uses it differently than most 
courts have done in the past. The traditional use of reliance has been to 
make it a necessary element of ca~sation.~7 Under the flexible duty ap- 
proach, the plaintiff's reasonable reliance upon defendant's misrepre- 
sentation or failure to disclose is still a necessary element in the proof of 
causation, but the foreseeability of that reliance by the defendant also 
affects the defendant's duty. Whenever it is reasonably foreseeable to a 
defendant that the plaintiff may rely upon his information or judgment, 
the defendant is under a more stringent duty to truthfully disclose all 
material facts. In this context, three of the factors listed in White - 
relationship, access to inf~rmation,~s and awareness of reliance - be- 
come crucial as elements of proof which substantiate forseeability of re- 
liance. When these factors are proved, the defendant's duty becomes 
more stringent because the probability and foreseeability of reliance are 
greater. 
Another important factor which causes the duty to vary is the benefit 
defendant receives from the securities transaction. The reasoning is that 
the motivation to mislead is greater when the deceiver stands to be re- 
warded for such action. The court addressed this problem directly in 
one factor and indirectly in another, holding the defendant to a higher 
duty when he actually benefits from or when he is active in initiating the 
transaction. Together, initiation and benefit are elements of proof 
(The criminal sections of the Exchange Act are probably not sufficient deterrents because of 
their limited $10,000 penalty, the reluctance of investors to institute criminal actions, and the 
problems following discovery and prosecution.) Stone, Fashioning a Lid for Pandora's Box: 
A Legitimate Role for Rule lob-5 in Private Actions Against Insider Trading on a National 
Stock Exchange, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 404,411 (1969). 
27See Comment, Reliance Under Rule lob-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 
72 COLUM. L. REV. 562,565 (1972). 
28Reliance is only justified if the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the defendant's 
access to information. If the plaintiff has no knowledge, his reliance is unreasonable. 
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giving foundation to the probability of an improper motive or ix~tent.~g 
A. Foreseeability of Reliance: Relationship of Defendant to  Plaintiff 
The relationship of the parties in a securities transaction has been 
crucial to the outcome of many cases.30 In Mills v .  Sarjem Corp.,3l for- 
mer shareholders brought suit against the purchasers of their shares who 
were involved in a scheme to gain control of a bridge building corpora- 
tion and then sell the bridges to the county at a profit. Noting that the 
transaction was at arms length and that the shares were purchased at a 
prive above fair market value, the court held that the purchasers had no 
duty to divulge their future plans concerning the resale of the property 
because no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties." In 
another case, Phillips v .  Reynolds 6 C 0 . p  it was held that no duty to dis- 
close material facts existed under rule lob-5 absent a special relationship 
between the ~ar t ies .3~  The defendant-broker was not held liable for 
failure to disclose a corporate deficit of nine million dollars when 
plaintiff had information explaining that twelve million dollars had 
been put into the corporation without profit. 
The existence of a fiduciary relationship has been an important con- 
sideration the courts have used to apply a higher and more exacting duty 
upon defendants.35 A formal fiduciary relationship exists when one of 
the parties is in a position classified by the law as a fiduciary. The three 
most important fiduciary positions found in securities law are broker- 
dealer,36 director,37 and corporate insider.38 Persons in all three posi- 
29The White court says, "we reject scienter or any other discussion of state of mind as a 
necessary and separate element of a lob-5 action." 495 F.2d at 734. Later on the court states, 
however, "While rejecting scienter and state of mind concepts as the standard itself, it [the 
flexible duty] requires the court to consider state of mind as an important factor in determining 
the scope of duty that Rule lob-5 imposes." 495 F.2d at 736. 
S0See, e.g., Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 
1973); Branham v. Material Systems Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Rothschild 
v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Brennan v. Midwestern United 
Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673,681-82 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969). 
3l133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955). 
32Zd. at 764. 
33294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
34Zd. at 1255. 
s5See generally cases cited note 30 supra; Comment, supra note 27 at 574. 
36See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (higher 
duty for fiduciary which Congress recognized the investment advisor to be); Hanley v. SEC, 415 
F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) (securities dealer has a special relationship with investors because 
his position implicitly warrants that his representations have adequate support); O'Neill v. 
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1964) (breach of fiduciary duty owed by broker or 
dealer may very well be the type of fraudulent activity barred by the rule); Smith v. Bear, 
237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956) (strict liability language applied to a broker-dealer because 
of his relationship to plaintiff); Mann, supra note 6, at 1210. 
37See, e.g., Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314-15, (5th Cir. 1959) (president and general 
manager held to a higher duty of a fiduciary); hlann, supra note 6, at 1210; Note, Proof of 
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tions are held to a higher duty because the law assumes that it is clearly 
foreseeable to such persons that those who associate with them will prob- 
ably rely more heavily on the information which they disseminate39 
An informal fiduciary relationship exists when the parties have de- 
veloped a relationship of trust and reliance over a substantial period of 
time.40 In Myzel u.  Fields,4l the Second Circuit considered important 
the fact that plaintiffs were dependent upon and trusted Myzel, who was 
not only a close friend and financial advisor, but a relative to the oper- 
ators of the company. In Vohs v.  D i ~ k s o n , ~ ~  the Fifth Circuit refused to 
hold a seller liable for failure to inform purchasers as to the nontransfer- 
ability of the private shares he sold them. Because the court felt it un- 
necessary to determine whether these shares had actually been issued 
under a private exemption, it refused to decide whether this failure had 
contravened a ruling by the Securities and Exchange Comrni~sion.~3 But 
the court did consider the relationship which was merely one of fellow 
employees, and the fact that no other sales had been made which would 
foster trust in the seller, to conclude that a higher duty was not proper. 
In essence, the court held that the relationship was not one in which the 
purchaser's reliance was foreseeable by the seller. 
Another kind of relationship that has been given attention by the 
courts involves professionals, accountants, lawyers, and those with many 
years of securities experience who make statements as experts.44 These 
defendants are held to a higher standard of care than nonexperts "because 
investors may be expected to rely on their statements or because they 
should know better. "45 In Drake v .  Thor Power Tool Co., 46 an account- 
- 
Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-fraud Rule lob-5,63 MICH. L. b v ,  1070, 
1079-80 (1965) (both discuss the higher duty that the law exacts upon those who are "closely 
associated with an issuing corporation"). But cf: O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767-68 
(breach of a general fiduciary relationship not enough for liability under lob-5; breach must 
involve a sale or exchange). 
38See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-42 (7th Cir. 1963) (rule lob-5 clearly creates 
a fiduciary relationship between "insiders" and "outsiders" with the higher duty upon the 
insiders); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 139-40 (D. Md. 1968) (rule lob-5 imposes a higher 
duty upon insiders dealing with outsiders); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 
828-29 (D. Del. 1951) (insiders, such as majority stockholders, cannot purchase minority 
stockholders' shares without complying with the duty imposed on a fiduciary). 
39See generally notes 36-38 supra. 
40White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th 
Cir. 1968); Rothschild v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
dl386 F.2d 718,735 (8th Cir. 1968). 
42495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974). 
43Zd. at 625. (SEC had ruled that a seller must inform the buyer as to any limitations on 
resale and holding of securities because of being issued under an exemption from registration.) 
44See generally Blakely v. Lisac 357 F. Supp. 255, 266 (D. Ore. 1972); Lane v. Midwest Banc- 
shares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200, 1208-09 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Bowman & Bourdon Inc. v. Rohr, 
296 F. Supp. 847, 851-52 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd 417 F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1969); Drake v. Thor 
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104-05 (N.D. 111. 1967). 
45Mann, supra note 6, at 1213. 
46282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967). 
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ing firm was charged with certifying false financial statements and using 
incorrect auditing procedures. The court held on a motion to dismiss 
that accountants have a peculiar relationship with the public and as 
such cannot be immunized from suit though they have not benefited 
from their  misrepresentation^.^^ In Blakely v .  Li~ac,~g the court stated 
that an attorney could not "escape liability for fraud 'by closing his eyes 
to what he saw and could readily understand.' "49 There, an attorney- 
director of the corporation was held liable for misleading financial infor- 
mation in the prospectus which he should have investigated. 
Therefore, the reasoning behind the imposition of a more stringent 
duty on experts and those in the position of a fiduciary is that the rela- 
tionship makes plaintiff's reliance more foreseeable to the defendant. In 
that situation, a strict duty is deemed necessary to deter the defendant 
from being dishonest. Thus, the imposition of a higher duty makes the 
parties' positions more equal - facilitating the disclosure of material 
information, deterring fraudulent activity, and allowing the parties to 
bargain as they wish. 
B. Foreseeability of Reliance: Defendant's Access to Information as 
Compared to Plaintiffs Access 
The comparative access of the parties to information has been the sub- 
ject of many judicial opinions, with most courts holding the party with 
the higher access to the higher duty.50 The reasoning is best explained 
in Speed u. Transamerica Corp., where the court said: 
The rule is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stock- 
holder, to purchase the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing 
material facts affecting the value of the stock, known to the majority 
stockholder by virtue of his inside position but not known to the selling 
minority stockholder, which information would have affected the judg- 
ment of the sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of 
preuenting a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair 
advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders. It is an attempt to 
provide some degree of equalization of bargaining position in order that 
the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any such transac- 
tion.51 
47Zd. at 104-05. 
48357 F. Supp. 225 (D. Ore. 1972). 
49Zd. at 266. 
50See generally City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230-31 (8th Cir. 1970); 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); 
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1965); Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 
F. Supp. 878, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 
353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905,915-16 (W.D. Mo. 1970); 
Bennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966). 
5199 F. Supp. 808,828-29 (D. Del. 1951) (emphasis added). 
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Traditionally, courts have treated access to information and duty 
according to three defendant cla&ifications - "insider, "52 " tippee, '53 
and "broker-dealer."54 While each has been held to a higher duty be- 
cause of his greater access to information, it should be emphasized that 
these classifications are legal conclusions and should be rejected if not 
supported by the facts. The proper analysis then deals with access to 
information55 rather than fitting each defendapt into a particular classifi- 
cation. As the court in Harnett v.  Ryan Homes, Inc., explained, 
The question of who is an "insider," therefore, cannot be decided on the 
basis of the title one holds in the corporate organization. A director, or 
officer, or even the president of a corporation cannot always and invari- 
ably be classified as an insider. The analysis turns instead, on the basis of 
what a party knows or reasonably should know considering the informa- 
tion to which he has access.56 
In another case, Vohs v .  D i ~ k s o n , ~ ~  the Fifth Circuit refused to hold the 
defendant to a higher duty even though he was the plaintiff's superior 
and "key" employee for a stock purchase plan. The court reasoned that 
defendant's superior position did not give him greater access to informa- 
t ion. 
There are two major reasons why the finding of greater access re- 
quires the imposition of a higher duty. First, those with greater access 
can more easily defraud others58 and the imposition of a higher duty pro- 
52An insider is assumed to have greater access to information because of his position in the 
corporation. His status, by definition, entitles him to direct information not available to the 
public. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); Comment, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. 
United States- The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule IOb-5,1973 UTAH L. REV. 119, 123-24. 
53A tippee is distinguished from an insider because his information is received indirectly, 
e.g., from an insider, rather than directly from the corporation. Courts often confuse the two. 
Id. at 125-26. 
54A broker-dealer is assumed to have higher access, not because he has some connection to 
corporate information, but because he is an expert and can better analyze market information. 
He also is more familiar with how the market information is obtained. Id.  at 125-26. 
55 
[TI he nondisclosed facts here were in Rhoade's [defendant's] personal knowledge or 
private files and were not available to Rochez [plaintiff] . . . . Thus, Rochez's status as an 
insider, his financial expertise and his business acumen are all irrelevant, for he had no 
access to the critical information or any opportunity to discover the non-disclosed facts. 
Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,419 (3d Cir. 1974). 
56360 F. Supp. 878, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (citation omitted); 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824 (1965). 
57495 F.2d 607,623 (5th Cir. 1974). 
58 
The  fraud involved in buying or selling on the basis of inside information is based first 
on the user's relationship with the corporation being such as to allow his access to infor- 
mation intended only for a corporate purpose- not for his personal benefit. For the 
instant, we shall assume this to have been met. Secondly, the fraud rests ". . . upon the 
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing 
it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 
912 (1961)." 
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tects plaintiffs by making violations of the rule easier to prove. The 
party with superior access realizes that incomplete disclosures or mis- 
representations are easier to prove and is therefore more likely to disclose 
material information.59 Second, the defendant with greater access to in- 
formation is more likely to be relied upon by the other party," and a 
higher duty, which puts both parties in a more equal bargaining posi- 
tion,G1 is necessary to deter the defendant fiom utilizing plaintiff's re- 
liance unfairly. 
Courts have also considered the plaintiff's access to information62 in 
determining whether his reliance was foreseeable and reasonable, as 
stated in City National Bank v.  Vanderboom: 
Not only should the plaintiff have to prove that he relied on defendant's 
statements, but he must convince the trier of fact that his reliance was 
reasonable under all the circumstances at the time. In this way recovery 
would be denied to those who, because of their "business sophistication", 
acumen, or ready access to the information involved, could reasonably be 
expected to exercise a higher degree of care and investigation in their 
dealings.63 
Plaintiffs who are experts or have ready access to information have 
been denied recovery by the process of holding the defendant to a lower 
duty.64 In Vanderb~om,~~ a bank loaned money to investors who used 
the funds to buy stock. When the bank sued to recover on the outstand- 
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), 
modified, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968); The real problem under rule lob-5 being the injury 
to the plaintiff, there is no concern that the defendant violated some fiduciary duty that he 
owed to the corporation. 
59See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 
819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 
264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Brennan v. Mid- 
western United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1966); But cf. Vohs v. Dickson, 
495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974). The court refused to hold the defendant liable for knowledge 
of financial matters where he was an ordinary employee with access because of his ownership 
of stock. Plaintiff had no access to corporate books. 
6OReliance is only justified if the plaintiff actually knows that the defendant has higher access 
or assumes higher access because of the defendant's position - insider, broker-dealer, or cor- 
porate director. 
GISpeed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808,828-29 (D. Del. 1951). 
62The law often assumes that experts or professionals have greater access to information. 
See Sandor v. Ruffer, Ballan & Co., 309 F. Supp. 849,859 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
63422 F.2d 221, 230 n.10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (citation omitted). 
W e e  generally Fey v. Walston, Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire 
Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Wiggs, 443 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1971) (share- 
holder who sued the president of the corporation for failure to disclose inside information was 
barred recovery when the court found that the information was available to plaintiff through 
the public market); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970); Baumel 
v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968); Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 
1200, 1209 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (insider's duty of disclosure depends in part upon the extent of 
knowledge and access to information of party he is dealing with). 
65422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir;), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). 
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ing investors' notes, the defendant investors counterclaimed that a bank 
officer had misrepresented the financial position of those corporations 
in which the borrowed money had been invested. The  counterclaim was 
dismissed because the court found that the investors had ready access to 
the information from other sources.66 In another case, Colonial Realty 
Corp. v .  Brunswick Corp.,67 the court refused to find liability when the 
interest rate and terms of a financial agreement guaranteed by the de- 
fendant were left off the company's prospectus. The omission was 
deemed immaterial because the interest rate had been discussed in vari- 
ous financial magazines and the plaintiff was an experienced dealer in 
this particular stock.68 
C. Foreseeability of Reliance: The  Defendant's Awareness of Whether 
the Plaintiff Was Relying upon Their Relationship 
The issue of foreseeability and its proof through relationship and 
comparative access to information is immaterial if it can be proven that 
the defendant knew that the plaintiff was in fact relying upon their rela- 
tionship. The guessing game is over, opportunity for abuse is great, and 
the courts have responded with a higher duty that meets the fact situa- 
tion.69 The higher duty is justified by the same arguments used for 
relationship and access, but the arguments are even stronger when the 
issue is not probable, but actual reliance. 
D. Benefit to the Defendant: T h e  Benefit That the Defendant Derives 
from the Relationship 
Courts have held defendants to a higher duty where they make repre- 
sentations in the course of an economically motivated transa~tion.~O In 
Affiliated Ute Citizens IJ. United States,71 the Supreme Court held that 
66 
The investors had access to all the books and records of AHB and PL and I during the 
four month option period. . . . (They also had access to the auditor's report) Since the 
investors. . . had ready access to the information involved, it is reasonable to expect 
them to exercise a higher degree of care than third parties [bank] . . . . 
Id .  at 231. 
'j7337 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
6*Zd. at 557. 
69See, e.g., Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363, 373-74 (2d 
Cir. 1973); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1967); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 
180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255,264 (D. Ore. 1972). 
'Osee, Gordon v. Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905, 916 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (investors who had ready 
access to information held to a higher duty than third parties who didn't profit from the 
transaction); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 
1966) (insider can breach his duty to outsider even though the advantage to be gained comes 
from third parties); But cJ: Fey v. Walston 8c Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1048 (7th Cir. 1974) (if sales- 
man fulfills his fiduciary and other obligations of honesty with a customer, additional motive 
for commissions does not make him liable). 
71406 U.S. 128, 147 (1972). 
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if the two defendants and the bank had acted merely as transfer agents, 
they would have had no duty to disclose information. As it was, they 
were found liable because they benefited from the transactions by way of 
commissions and higher bank deposits. In Carr v. Warner,72 the 
court, in determining that no liability existed, considered the fact that 
defendants made no unusual profit. In Chasins v. Smith Barney 6. C O . , ~ ~  
the defendant stock broker was held liable when he failed to advise the 
plaintiff that he was making a market in securities which he had recom- 
mended highly to the plaintiff. The Second Circuit said that the duty is 
higher "where one ['s] motivation is economic self-interest. . . . The 
economic self-interest of a market-maker in over-the-counter securities 
may be greater than that of a simple principle, and the market-maker 
status should have been disclosed."74 
Although actual benefit is not required for recovery,75 its presence is 
certainly a major factor in the determination of liability. It is easier for 
the court to find a party who benefited liable than one who did not? 
As an element of proof going toward improper motive or intent, benefit 
is only important when it gives insight into the defendant's probable 
motives for arranging the transaction. A person in a position to benefit 
from a securities transaction is considered more likely to shade the truth 
or to withhold material information, especially when his benefit in- 
creases with the falsity of his representation. When the defendant is 
benefited equally by false or true statements, as in the case of an attorney 
or an accountant whose benefit is merely a fee for services performed, 
other considerations of relationship, access to information, and reliance 
are more material.77 
E. Benefit to the Defendant: Defendant's Activity in Initiating 
the Transaction 
The defendant's activity in initiating the transaction has been an im- 
portant factor in several ~ases.~8 One commentator79 has suggested that 
initiation is the crucial difference between two cases with similar fact 
situations. In Sandor v. Ruffer, Ballan elr Co.,SO the court placed great 
72 137 F. Supp. 6 1 1,614-15 (D. Mass. 1955). 
73(1969-1970 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fi 92,712 (2d Cir. July 7, 1970). 
741d. at 99, 137. 
75See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, 5 8.5(584) at 208.47-48. 
76Zd. at 204.48. 
771d. 
78See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Kuehnert v. Texstar 
Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969); List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965); 
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); Hecht v. Harris, Upham 8c Co., 283 F. 
Supp. 417 (N.D. Calif. 1968). 
79Mann, supra note 6 at 1219-20. 
B0309 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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weight upon the fact that the plaintiff had initiated the transaction and 
that it was his "lust for new issues" which led him to the defendants. 
Plaintiff's activity in initiating the deal was significant in the court's 
holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove material misrepresentations 
and reliance. Similarly, in Hafner v .  Forest Laboratories Zn~. ,~ l  the 
Third Circuit held that no material misrepresentations occurred but 
asserted that if the defendant had initiated the transactions, triable issues 
of fact might then have been raised. In Canizaro v .  Kohlmeyer 6. C O . , ~ ~  
the court emphasized initiation and participation in the transaction 
when it stated that a "broker's obligation to his customer to investigate 
and disclose all material facts must surely increase in direct proportion to 
the degree of his participation in the sale. "83 
The purpose for holding the initiator or major participant to a higher 
duty is based on the assumption that the initiator or participant must 
stand to benefit from the transaction and, therefore, has more reasons to 
act with improper motives. It is clear that one with intent to defraud by 
using secret information can rarely take advantage of his situation unless 
he becomes involved in a stock transaction. The  initiation may be the 
outgrowth of a plan to defraud through concealment or misrepresenta- 
tions. This logic applies to all parties in a transaction and case law has 
reflected this view by holding plaintiffs as well as defendants to a higher 
duty if they are active in initiating the exchange.84 
IV. THE FLEXIBLE DUTY AS AFFECTED BY FORESEEABLE 
RELIANCE AND BENEFIT 
Five fact situations encompass the flexible duty as it is affected by fore- 
seeable reliance and benefit. Assuming actual misrepresentations, they 
are: (1) intent to defraud, (2) foreseeable reliance and benefit, (3) foresee- 
able reliance, (4) benefit, and (5) a mere misrepresentation of material 
information - absent any of the other four. How these five situations 
affect the flexible duty can best be explained by use of the diagram on the 
following page. 
The flexible duty is dependent upon and changes according to the 
arrangement of the several factors on the scale. Assuming the factors are 
proven at trial, all of them except a mere misrepresentation would in- 
crease the defendant's duty. A mere misrepresentation is shown by 
putting no weight on the scale and allowing the pointer to rest in the area 
of no liability. Benefit, alone, would probably not be sufficient for a 
violation of the rule absent an intentional misrepresentation. The  
major use of benefit is in combination with other factors which by them- 
'3'345 F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 1965). 
S2370 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. La. 1974). 
83Zd. at 289. 
84See generally supra note 78. 
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selves would not require a high enough duty for a violation. Foreseeable 
reliance by itself would probably support a violation. The standard 
would be something higher than negligence since the defendant who can 
foresee the plaintiff's reliance is not in the same position as the average 
reasonable man. Foreseeable reliance with benefit does not make for an 
automatic violation, but the defendant should use extreme care to get 
information to the plaintiff so as to prevent a material misrepresentation. 
This is especially so if the defendant stands to benefit from the transac- 
tion. Intent to defraud is the highest duty, and if present, rule lob-5 is 
always violated since the language of the rule was enacted to deter and 
specifically forbids fraud. 
The effect or weight of each factor varies according to the proof given 
at trial. For example, proof that the defendant knew the plaintiff was 
relying on their relationship in making investment decisions would 
create a greater shift on the scale than would evidence that the defendant 
had greater access to information, but had not used his access to get more 
information. In essence, there is a direct relationship between the 
weight of the evidence in support of each factor and the effect that each 
factor has on duty as represented by the scale. 
The flexible duty of White is an outgrowth of rule lob-5 litigation and 
represents one court's attempt to define a standard which meets all the 
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fact situations possible in a rule lob-5 violation. In rejecting the applica- 
tion of singular terms, such as scienter, the flexible duty approach rejects 
legal conclusions for a more detailed analysis based on five factors. It 
gives potential parties a checklist of factors which they can use to deter- 
mine the degree of care required in their situation to avoid liability. 
By giving potential violators a checklist so that duty can be deter- 
mined before security transactions are engaged in, the court has given 
effect to the deterrent purpose of the rule without overburdening the 
market with a duty, such as strict liability, that would keep persons from 
acting for fear of a violation. This is accomplished by imposing no higher 
duty than evolves from the facts. For example, only those who benefit 
from the transaction and who foresee the other party's reliance are bur- 
dened with the duty of extreme care. Where these two elements are 
lacking, the defendant has a lesser duty not to intentionally misrepresent 
material facts. In both situations, the deterrent effect is the same. The 
differing standard is justified by the separate facts in each case. 
A major problem with the flexible duty is that the extreme care re- 
quired when foreseeable reliance and benefit are present is too close to 
strict liability. Broker-dealers, and other experts who would most often 
be held to the duty of extreme care, may not be able to meet the standard 
if a misrepresentation is found. The problem is increased by the fact 
that broker-dealers often cannot obtain liability insurance to protect 
themselves. Unless they have sufficient assets for self-insurance, one 
conviction for violating the rule could result in bankruptcy. Courts 
could remedy this problem, however, by refraining from imposing the 
extreme care standard unless it is clearly justified by the facts. Another 
answer may be to equate extreme care with that degree of care exercised 
by other broker-dealers in similar situations. In any event, courts are 
capable of adjusting the duty so that it produces fair and just results. 
In conclusion, the flexible duty approach is a realistic solution to rule 
lob-5. The duty effectuates the purpose of the rule, adjusts to the pos- 
sible fact situations, and reveals analysis that can be used to determine 
the applicable standard of care for persons involved in security transac- 
tions. 
